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DAVID SHAPIRO'S ADVERSARY
STATEMENT ON FEDERALISM
Patrick E. Higginbotham*

FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE. By David L. Shapiro. Evanston:
Northwestern University Press. 1995. Pp. ix, 154. $19.95.
This book reflects the extraordinary combined force of scholarship and advocacy by a master of both. Professor David Shapiro
practiced as a young lawyer with a distinguished Washington, D.C.
law firm and served as Deputy Solicitor General for nearly three
years. He is a Professor at Harvard Law School and one of the
leading scholars in the field of federal courts and federal jurisdiction. For many years, lie has authored the leading casebook in the
field.
Asked to deliver the Julius Rosenthal Lectures at Northwestern
University School of Law in 1994, Professor Shapiro saw that the
three-lecture series offered the opportunity to structure a treatment
of federalism in an adversary format, without losing the balanced
and honest presentation of the scholar. In the first lecture, he states
the case for the "nationalist," in the second, for the "federalist,"
and in the third lecture he offers a synthesis. Each lecture has the
approximate length of a merit brief in the Supreme Court. Together, the three lectures - now published as Federalism: A
Dialogue - comprise a dialogue in the tradition of Henry Hart,
Lon Fuller, and the classic Socratic process, but they are much
more.
I do not see a book review as a launching pad for the reviewer's
ideas, with little more than a mention of the book being reviewed.
Rather, I hope to describe the three lectures by providing samples
from each with no pretense of capturing nuance or of complete description. My views of their strengths and weaknesses conclude the
review.
The direct draw upon the judiciary's adversary model allows
Shapiro's hand to move free from the clutter of balancing-as-yougo. This model, as applied in the first two lectures, allows him to
present each case in its most powerful form, to state the polarities
before turning to the gray areas of current debate. The result is
clarity and balance.

* Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. B.A. 1960, LL.B. 1961,
University of Alabama. - Ed.
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There is a vast amount of writing about federalism; most of it
circles like satellites in solitary orbits. Yet, this book brings rich
insight and freshness to the subject by sorting the many arguments
and exposing them to the light of context and relevance. This is no
task for the timid. An adversary brief demands that arguments be
ordered and marshaled, a challenge with so much in the libraries
claiming relevance.
I.

THE NATIONALIST BRIEF

The first lecture begins with a frontal assault: There is no significant constitutional restraint on national power or on the displacement of state law and regulation by national law. Shapiro proceeds
by denying that the Constitution was a compact and instead asserts
that its authority came directly from the people; the fact that constitutional power was not drawn from sovereign states "is confirmed
by the background and circumstances of the Constitutional Convention, the nature of the ratification process, and most significantly by the text and structure of the Constitution itself" (p. 15).
To bolster this argument, Shapiro points out that no state could
block ratification and that ratification required support of states
representing a majority of the population of the new Union. Quoting Jefferson Powell, he points to the strongest evidence of the nationalist thesis: " '[T]he Constitution contained no explicit
guarantee of state sovereignty'" (p. 17). Nor, he says, could any
such constitutional guarantee be implied, given that the thenprevailing legal thought refused to recognize divided sovereignty.
Turning to the Preamble, Shapiro asserts that the language "We the
People" was not simply an airy opening flourish. Certainly Patrick
Henry, the master of the flourish, did not see it that way: He complained that the Preamble should begin, "We the States."
Then, with the deftness of the advocate, Shapiro draws support
from the familiar argument that the Bill of Rights, won by the antiFederalists in their carving of federal power, evidences a sovereign
role for states. He does not deny that such an inference is permissible or that it has force when viewed alone. Rather, he points to the
diluting, if not alternative, inference that the Bill of Rights in limiting federal power delivered on the Preamble's promise to protect
individuals from federal excesses. The brief, after many more arguments than I have mentioned, asserts that any constitutional force
to state sovereignty has been eroded by subsequent amendments,
evolving constitutional doctrine, and historical practice (p. 26). It
concedes, but then discounts the force of The Federalist Papers by
reminding us that they were the work of advocates.
Part Two of the brief for national authority declares that "The
Existence of Significant State Autonomy is Economically Counter-
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productive" (p. 34). This section of the brief takes the conclusions
of Part One as given - especially that there are few constitutional
limits upon the exercise of national power at the expense of state
power. It examines the optimal allocation of power between state
and federal government. In this context, Shapiro asserts that traditional economic argument rests on "asserted virtues of rivalry or
competition" (p. 35). The states supposedly serve as countervailing
forces to the federal government and engage in competition among
themselves. Again, Shapiro takes the debate to first principles: He
contends that the resistance to national authority "hinge[s] in large
part on a value judgment that is sometimes, but not always, made
explicit - a judgment that a free and competitive market is presumptively ... preferable to governmental regulation" (p. 37). He
continues by arguing that even the market's supporters recognize
that its imperfections will require repair best done at the national
level; in any event, the model of competing states is overstated easily. Political rights of travel do not assure practical economic freedoms; it is not so easy to move capital investment from a declining
market to a rising market; and the ever-haunting externalities and
transaction costs will persist. As for "public goods," Shapiro sees
"no self-evident reason why the size of those units, and the basis for
raising the needed revenues to run them (including, perhaps, some
form of user fees in some instances) cannot or should not be determined on a national level" (p. 40).
Shapiro's brief for nationalist government concludes by asserting that we need a "Strong National Authority ... in Order to Protect the Rights and Interests of Individuals and Groups" (p. 50).
This contention rests heavily on the history of federal expansion of
constitutional limits upon states by federal courts and Congress.
II. THE FEDERALIST

BRIEF

The brief for federalism begins by asserting that the constitutional convention took place against a "background of independent
state power ... and was called for the explicit purpose of amending
the Articles [of Confederation]" (p. 59). Shapiro recalls that the
delegates were not elected by the people but appointed by state
governments, each of which had an equal vote. Turning again to
The Federalist Papers, the argument becomes that, although they
were written to persuade, they cannot be ignored as strong contemporaneous expressions of purpose - to reassure the states and
thereby to secure ratification of the Constitution. Shapiro continues by arguing that the states were the building blocks of union.
For example, he points out that the electorate of the House of Representatives was the electorate of the most numerous branch of the
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state legislature, and that Article I not only limits the powers of the
national government but also protects the states from each other.
After marching through constitutional text, the brief turns to the
Guaranty Clause of Article IV. Shapiro's handling of the Guaranty
Clause in the point-counterpoint of the two briefs illustrates the
strength of the dialogue. In the first brief, Shapiro argued that Article IV "seems essentially designed to protect the states from each
other (and to provide for the common defense)" (p. 21). He read it
as a federally enforceable limitation on the state, an admonition to
the people of the states to maintain a republican form of government. Through the eyes of the federalist, however, Article IV
seems to protect states from federal interference; the clause becomes a guarantee of state autonomy.
The brief for the federalist position moves to the "Virtues of
State Autonomy from Economic and Related Policy Perspectives"
(p. 76), and then to "Liberty and Social Virtues of State Autonomy"
(p. 91). It also parades the familiar virtues of local rule, including
the option for regional compacts when "local" problems do not
conform to state boundaries. The brief advances the state as the
presumptive level of government and insists that the case for federal power must overcome that presumption. Indeed, it contends
that when a need arises for units larger than a single state, we logically should begin with an examination of interstate compacts
before turning to the federal level. Relatedly, the very existence of
several polities fosters individual freedom. An individual may
move to a state that is more hospitable than his home state. Finally,
the brief argues that the state itself can decide best whether a local
problem is handled best by counties or cities.

III.

SHAPIRO'S SYNTHESIS

Having advocated the federalist and nationalist positions,
Professor Shapiro, in his third and concluding lecture, sorts through
the arguments, locates common ground, and gives us his own views
unshaped by advocacy. In his words, he undertakes to "strike the
balance."
Shapiro first points to constitutional text in emphasizing three
points "worthy of repetition" (p. 110). First, the broad Article I
power, despite its coupling with the expansionary power of the Necessary and Proper Clauses, has deliberate jurisdictional limits; second, the Constitution secures national protection to states from
other states and protection from requests of "insurrection from
within" (p. 111); third, as Deborah Merritt writes,1 the guarantee of
1. See Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guaranty Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for
a Third Century, 88 CoLUM. L. REv. 1 (1988).
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a republican form of government is "a promise of protection both
against upheaval from within and intrusion from without," a guarantee that the states will be protected "as politically functioning entities" (p. 111). Shapiro points to New York v. United Statesz as
confirmation of the decisional force of the Guaranty Clause - that
is, that the core of the guarantee of a republican form of government is political accountability of the representatives. It follows
that the national government may not coerce the representative to
take legislative action.
Shapiro acknowledges that the Civil War and the New Deal
brought large shifts in the state-federal balance. He points out that
despite these nationalizing forces, the Civil War amendments, the
courts' expansive reading of the Commerce Clause, and changes in
technology, much of the regulation of our daily lives - of our
"property, education, local transportation, family relations, [and of]
the definition of liability-creating civil and criminal conduct" (p.
114), for example-has remained with the states. Shapiro explains
why. In his eyes, "significant structural reasons [explain] the retention of state authority in so many ·areas of general importance" (p.
116). These structures include the bicameral national legislature where each state is assured at least one representative - the Senate - where each state is assured two senators - and the Electoral
College - where presidential politics are channeled to state-bystate campaigns. These, in turn, are supported by the Supreme
Court's insistence that Congress speak clearly when it would preempt state law. But he finds much more than structural arrangements in these constitutional texts.
Shapiro points to a " 'sub-constitutional' area of considerable
breadth where strong forces work toward the continued recognition
of state authority but do not compel it" (p. 118). Several forces
operate in this subconstitutional area to uphold the states as functioning political entities. The allocation of the burden of persuasion
provides such reenforcement. Shapiro would allocate the burden to
those who would contend for national power and give to the states
the presumptive right. Furthermore, Shapiro places importance on
the fact that states inevitably tailor and shape the national programs
that they implement. Finally, he suggests that the opportunities for
regional cooperation - "intermediate federalism" - also are identified best by states. Shapiro sees potential for such ventures and
uses New York v. United States as an example (p. 127).
2. 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that portions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Act requiring states to accept ownership of waste or regulate according to Congress's tenns
violate the Tenth Amendment). Shapiro states: "[T]he decision may be the most coherent
and effective effort to address the constitutional underpinnings of federalism to have
emerged from the Supreme Court's continuing struggle with the issue over two centuries." P.
111.
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His larger point is that some national roles actually support federalism. He identifies five: first, when a necessary public good will
not be furnished absent national power; second, when economies of
scale are achievable only nationally - for example, safe air traffic;
third, when national power enters the dialogue of private rights;
fourth, when legislation affects redistribution of wealth; and fifth,
when the c.ourts play a role in monitoring congressional purpose.
The mark of this subconstitutional zone is flexibility. Its flexibility is essential given that the zone is cut athwart with powerful centripetal forces that must oscillate with powerful centrifugal forces.
IV. THE

DIALOGUE CONTINUED

I only have skimmed these tightly organized lectures to give the
reader some idea of their subject and treatment. By definition, my
review presents an incomplete and distorted view of this book,
though a distortion correctable by reading. At almost any tum, the
regular players in this debate who do read this book can, and some
will, point to a contention and scoff, saying that it fails to develop
the full range of relevant scholarship. For example, they may dwell
upon the fact that Shapiro sometimes devotes few words to enormously complex subjects such as the treatment of the economics of
state rivalry, races to the bottom, and convoys. Such criticism will
miss a large point about this book. In the process of writing a brief,
a dialogue leading to judgment, advocates leave parts on the cutting
room floor, and for good reason. They fall under the forces of context and relevance, the discipline of dialogue. That is not to demean their contribution. To the contrary, the intricate explication
of theories of public choice and the economics of state rivalry are
prerequisites to such a writing. That material left on the cutting
room floor says much about the roles of the cut and uncut. The one
does not displace the other; they remain in complementary tandem
serving different purposes. This is a dialogue, not an exploration of
fresh material and data, as Professor Shapiro makes plain at the
outset.
The debate about federalism is at least as old as the republic,
true enough, but this work arrives at a particularly propitious time.
There is a large discontent with remote governmental decisionmaking, if the debates of political campaigns are accurate signals, and I
think they are. We are seeing political leaders describing their work
as revolutionary when it aims to return federal decisions to local
government. In short, there is a heated debate now in progress
about the "best" location of decisionmaking for specific social
problems. Professor Shapiro's dialogue is about the meaning of
"best."
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Perhaps Professor Shapiro's message adapts to the view of the
reader, but I found his work to be proof of a large theorem: Process matters - in both instrumental and intrinsic terms. -In the immediate sense, the process chosen by Professor Shapiro is the jewel
in this work. In a larger sense, the very fact that our state governments have work to do that of necessity cannot be done at the federal level - and that the federal government does work that the
states are better suited to do - dictates the terms of debate over
the location of decisional responsibility for government programs.
I see federalism as a constitutionally ordered structure and substantive concept. It is also a process. As Professor Shapiro puts it,
"the true genius of American federalism lies in the continuing, and
constitutionally assured, basis for dialogue - for moral, political,
economic, and social debate over the merits of the allocation of
power among the various branches" (p. 140). The book offers a
superb defense of federalism, a lasting contribution. There is more.
His writing proves the power of Socratic process, so long ago appropriated by our profession. Moreover, federalism ultimately wears
its strongest armor as a constitutionally required process. Professor
Shapiro's book leaves the reader painfully aware of how often that
assertion is undervalued and its wisdom missed.
Extolling the virtue of federalism as a process does not mean
that it is without need of normative support. At least two recent
Supreme Court decisions suggest that the structural protections surrounding the process require judicial support. In New York v.
United States, the Court located a limit upon federal power in the
line between the persuasion and coercion of state representatives.3
Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court was foreshadowed by her
writing in FERC v. Mississippi. 4 I suspect Justice Black would have
joined her in New York v. United States, as his own opinion in Testa
v. Kaus required state courts to enforce federal law. The lesson of
Testa was that federal law is, by definition, the creature of state citizens and thus cannot offend state policy.6 It is true that federal law
is not foreign law and that the lines between the people and the
Constitution are at times direct and do not pass through the statehouse. Nonetheless, refusing to tolerate a co-opting of people's
elected representatives lies comfortably with this core principle of
Testa.
The extraordinary decision of United States v. Lopez7 came
down while Professor Shapiro's book was in galley. He therefore
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 166-69.
456 U.S. 742 (1982).
330 U.S. 386 (1947).
See 330 U.S. at 392-93.
115 s. Ct. 1624 (1995).
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discusses Lopez in the Epilogue and is cautious about its full implications. Lopez places at the least a large cloud on the vision of
unlimited congressional power under the Commerce Clause. Earnest predictions of where Lopez will take Commerce Clause jurisprudence seem little more than educated hope, and the possibilities
seem widely divergent. Lopez may amount to little more than symbolic jurisprudence - a fleeting genuflect to limits upon congressional power that in practice are always tantalizingly just out of
reach. On the other hand, it may evidence a willingness of the
Court to locate limits. Having drawn a line, it must either draw
another or erase.
With all respect to the four dissenting justices, the Lopez Court
had no real choice, and that is the large blinking caution light hung
out by that case. In its brief and oral argument, the Government
threw down the gauntlet by refusing to concede and by failing to
identify any limits upon the commerce power that would remain if
the Court sustained the statute. A total lack of judicially enforceable limits under the Commerce Clause cannot comport with a vision
of the Constitution as an organic instrument. Our reverential invocations of dispersed power demand more than procedural limits.
Lopez could not uphold the prohibition against carrying a gun in
proximity to a school without exposing a jurisprudence already
struggling with its candor. Of course, there is always the contention
that the structural channeling of the political process protects the
states when federal courts head for the sidelines, refusing to referee. This view appeals to my modest ambitions for the federal judiciary. That said, the recent inability of Congress to resist the
political temptation to federalize crime frontally challenges our
faith in the ability of states to fight for themselves in the political
arena, as it seems we have no normative limits enforceable by federal courts. This view of states' rights as the scraps left after the
congressional meal deals the Third Branch out of the federalist
structure. So, in the end, there is comfort in the concept of federalism as a dialogic process as well as in the encouraging signs in New
York v. United States and Lopez that the judicial retreat to the sidelines may not be for the whole game.

